US Army War College

USAWC Press
Monographs, Books, and Publications
5-1-1995

NATO Strategy in the 1990s: Reaping the Peace Dividend or the
Whirlwind?
William T. Johnsen Dr.

Follow this and additional works at: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs

Recommended Citation
Johnsen, William T. Dr., "NATO Strategy in the 1990s: Reaping the Peace Dividend or the Whirlwind?"
(1995). Monographs, Books, and Publications. 882.
https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/882

This Book is brought to you for free and open access by USAWC Press. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Monographs, Books, and Publications by an authorized administrator of USAWC Press.

NATO STRATEGY IN THE 1990s:
REAPING THE PEACE DIVIDEND OR THE WHIRLWIND?

William T. Johnsen

May 25, 1995

*******
The views expressed in this report are those of the author
and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of
the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the
U.S. Government. This report is cleared for public release;
distribution is unlimited.
*******
Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should be
forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army
War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013-5050. Comments also may
be conveyed directly to the Conference Organizer, Dr. Earl H.
Tilford, Jr., by calling commercial (717) 245-3234 or DSN 2423234. Comments also may be conveyed directly to the author by
calling commercial (717) 245-4076 or DSN 242-4076. Copies of
this report may be obtained from the Publications and Production
Office by calling commercial (717) 245-4133, DSN 242-4133, FAX
(717) 245-3820, or via the internet at rummelr@carlisleemh2.army.mil.
*******
All Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) monographs are loaded
on the Strategic Studies Institute Homepage for electronic
dissemination. SSI's Homepage address is: http://carlislewww.army.mil/usassi/.
*******
This study was originally presented at the U.S. Army War
College Sixth Annual Strategy Conference held April 26-28, 1995,
with the assistance of the Office of Net Assessment. The
Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to publish the paper as
part of its Conference Series.

ii

FOREWORD
Each April the Strategic Studies Institute hosts a
conference that addresses key strategic issues facing the Armed
Forces and the Nation. This year's theme, "Strategy During the
Lean Years: Learning from the Past and the Present," brought
together scholars, serving and retired military officers, and
civilian defense officials from the United States, Canada, and
the United Kingdom to discuss strategy formulation in times of
penury from Tacitus to Force XXI.
Dr. William T. Johnsen, Elihu Root Chair of Military Studies
at the U.S. Army War College and a former NATO staff officer,
examines The Alliance's New Strategic Concept. Released in
November 1991, the Strategic Concept represents NATO's response
to the dramatically changed security environment in Europe, and
the intense desire to reap the resultant "peace dividend." Dr.
Johnsen argues that a close reading of the strategy and
subsequent implementing initiatives refutes critics who claim
that NATO has failed to respond adequately to Europe's new
security conditions. The Strategic Concept dramatically expands
the scope of the Alliance's security objectives and functions,
takes NATO "out of area," and lays the foundation for massive
forces cuts, as well as for a fundamental restructuring of
Alliance military forces and command structures.
In Dr. Johnsen's opinion, however, the Alliance has been
less than successful in the practical implementation of its
Strategic Concept. These difficulties stem predominately from
confusion within the Alliance over NATO's ultimate function:
Should it remain a collective defense organization or should it
evolve into a collective security body? Dr. Johnsen argues that
for the foreseeable future NATO must remain focused on collective
defense. This recommendation has a number of consequences for the
Alliance, most notably for the pace of expanding its membership,
NATO's future role in crisis management and conflict resolution-especially peace operations, the conduct of other "non-Article V"
operations, and the degree to which nations can garner the peace
dividend.
For policymakers to grasp successfully the thorny strategic
issues facing them in an era of increasingly constrained
resources requires informed debate. The Strategic Studies
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Institute, therefore, offers this report as part of its
contributions to the ongoing discussions.

WILLIAM W. ALLEN
Colonel, U.S. Army
Acting Director
Strategic Studies Institute
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NATO STRATEGY IN THE 1990s:
REAPING THE PEACE DIVIDEND OR THE WHIRLWIND?
INTRODUCTION
In November 1991, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
released "The Alliance's New Strategic Concept" (hereafter
Strategic Concept), the first significant revision of NATO
strategy since the Alliance adopted the strategy of Flexible
Response in 1967. In this new document, NATO acknowledged the
dramatic improvements in the European security environment, and
positioned the Alliance for the post-Cold War era. Since 1991,
the Strategic Concept has guided NATO as it absorbed a unified
Germany, massively reduced allied forces, partially overhauled
its command and control structures, undertook peace operations in
the former Yugoslavia under the aegis of the U.N., conducted
combat operations for the first time in its history, and started
to tackle the difficult question of enlarging the Alliance.
Despite these accomplishments, pundits have subjected the
Alliance to a constant barrage of criticism. While individual
critiques fall across a wide spectrum, an overarching complaint
is that the Alliance has not adapted sufficiently to the changed
1
conditions in Europe. Because the Strategic Concept sets out the
basic principles of the Alliance and serves as the guide for
NATO's future direction, these criticisms also call into question
the validity of the Alliance's current strategy. This monograph,
therefore, will examine the elements of "The Alliance's New
Strategic Concept," to include its implementation and follow-on
initiatives, and assess whether these efforts adequately prepare
NATO to meet the 21st century.
This assessment begins with a brief description of the key
elements of the Strategic Concept to inform those who may have
been unable to examine it in detail because of the press of other
international and European crises. The study next assesses NATO's
numerous political and military initiatives for implementing the
Strategic Concept, with emphasis on evaluating their success.
Particular emphasis will be devoted to the issue of NATO's
growing participation in collective security activities, and the
inherent contradiction this holds for NATO's continued existence-specified in the Strategic Concept and routinely reiterated
thereafter--as a collective defense organization. The report
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closes with conclusions and recommendations for further Alliance
action.
KEY ELEMENTS OF THE ALLIANCE'S NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT
Before outlining the critical provisions of the Strategic
Concept, several preliminary points need to be raised. First,
"The Alliance's New Strategic Concept" is NATO's first
unclassified strategy; no small point. Second, previous strategic
concepts were published by the NATO Military Committee (MC). As a
consequence, while past strategies touched on political issues
and the North Atlantic Council (NAC) approved the documents, they
had a decidedly military thrust. In "The Alliance's New Strategic
Concept," on the other hand, the political element clearly
2
predominates. Third, because of the considerable political
content, France participated in the strategy review and approved
the Strategic Concept despite not belonging to the Alliance's
3
integrated military structure. Again, no small accomplishment
for the Alliance. Finally, while the strategy reflects
significant changes from the past, a number of continuities
remain.
The Strategic Context.
The Strategic Concept opens with "The Strategic Context,"
which chronicles the significant changes in Europe and assesses
their effects on the Alliance. This section contains three major
conclusions. First, the changed security environment alters
neither the purpose nor security functions of the Alliance.
Second, while the Alliance no longer confronts a massive,
specific threat (i.e., the Warsaw Pact), it still faces risks,
albeit unspecified. Third, the new security conditions offer ". .
. new opportunities for the Alliance to frame its strategy within
4
a broad approach to security." In short, this section provides
the contextual and philosophical underpinnings for the principles
of NATO strategy that followed.
These conclusions have important consequences for the
Alliance. On the one hand, unspecified risks extend well beyond
traditional threats to the territorial integrity and political
independence of its members, and now include "Alliance security
interests [which] can be affected by other risks of a wider
nature, . . . proliferation of weapons of mass destruction,
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disruption of the flow of vital resources and actions of
5
terrorism and sabotage." Protecting those interests implies that
the Alliance must be prepared, for the first time, to operate
6
outside the traditional NATO Treaty area. These consequences, in
turn, justify NATO involvement in crisis management and conflict
prevention. Finally, participation in crisis management and
conflict prevention activities provides the rationale for NATO
7
rapid reaction forces. Thus, this portion of the Strategic
Concept establishes precedents for expanding dramatically the
scope of the Alliance's security objectives and functions, takes
NATO "out of area," and lays down the requirement for a
fundamental restructuring of NATO forces; points that many
observers apparently have overlooked.
Alliance Objectives and Security Functions.
Despite establishing new missions for the Alliance, NATO
members strongly reaffirmed the essential purpose of the Alliance
originally laid out in the Washington Treaty (1949): ". . . to
safeguard the freedom and security of all its members by
political and military means in accordance with the principles of
8
the United Nations Charter." To achieve these objectives, the
Strategic Concept reaffirms NATO's long-standing policies of
credible deterrence and, if necessary, an effective defense.
Reflecting the new emphasis on crisis management, the allies
added the requirement to ". . . [maintain] an overall capability
to manage successfully crises affecting the security of its
9
members." To achieve these objectives, NATO members reiterated
the fundamental security tasks facing the Alliance:
• To provide one of the indispensable foundations for a
stable security environment in Europe, based on the growth of
democratic institutions and commitment to the peaceful resolution
of disputes, in which no country would be able to intimidate or
coerce any European nation or to impose hegemony through the
threat or use of force.
• To serve, as provided for in Article 4 of the North
Atlantic Treaty, as a transatlantic forum for Allied
consultations on any issues that affect their vital interests,
including possible developments posing risks for members
security, and for appropriate coordination of their efforts in
fields of common concern.
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• To deter and defend against any threat of aggression
against the territory of any NATO member state.
• To preserve the strategic balance within Europe.

10

A Broad Approach to Security.
To fulfill these tasks, the Alliance has broadened its
approach to security to include dialogue, cooperation, collective
defense, and crisis management and conflict prevention. Granted,
these elements have their roots in the concepts of defense and
dialogue first articulated in the Harmel Report (1967), but key
11
differences exist. On the one hand, the Strategic Concept
reverses the priority of Alliance functions; i.e., political
means henceforth will predominate over military considerations.
More profoundly, provisions for crisis management and conflict
prevention took on new meanings.
Some might argue that NATO has long practiced crisis
management procedures. While true, the new call for participation
in crisis management and conflict prevention differs vastly from
Cold War procedures intended to avert a full-scale conventional
and, perhaps, nuclear confrontation between NATO and the Warsaw
Pact. The new provisions establish that security is no longer a
matter of the 16 NATO members only, but is intertwined with
Europe as a whole. While this was true during the Cold War, the
critical difference is that the collapse of communism and the
Warsaw Pact now makes it possible for NATO to exercise its
security functions outside NATO territory. This circumstance
allows NATO to work in conjunction with regional (e.g., European
Union [EU], Western European Union [WEU], Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe [OSCE] [formerly CSCE]) or
international (e.g., U.N.) organizations.
But, this new "opportunity" to cooperate with these
frequently duplicative security organizations has not been
without its problems. The critical issue concerns: Which
institution is responsible for what? The short answer is that no
12
one knows. Worse yet, no one appears to be working out the
details that will delimit roles and responsibilities, eliminate
unnecessary overlap, or close the gaps between these supposedly
interlocking institutions. As a result, crisis management
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activities are cobbled together inefficiently (e.g., the WEU/NATO
maritime enforcement of the Yugoslav embargo), are confused
(e.g., the U.N. and NATO in Bosnia-Hercegovina), or simply fall
through the gaps (e.g., EU and OSCE in Nagorno-Karabakh, Moldova,
or Chechenya).
If NATO is to defend its interests (e.g., European
stability, resolving crises on NATO's periphery thus preventing
spillover onto NATO territory) effectively through crisis
management activities, then NATO must take the lead--now--in
defining the parameters of organizational roles and
responsibilities of the various European security institutions.
To do so, requires answers to the following questions:
• What shall be the current division of labor between NATO
and the EU/WEU?
• Will NATO continue in the future to act as a security arm
of the OSCE?
• What shall be the role between NATO and a future European
Security and Defense Identity (ESDI)?
• Given the NATO experience in Bosnia-Hercegovina, under
what conditions will the Alliance be willing to cooperate with
the U.N.?
Certainly, answers to these difficult questions will be
neither simply nor quickly found. Ideally, NATO would first build
internal consensus on its future role, and then on how NATO would
interact with other European institutions. After hammering out
its internal difficulties, NATO would then work out comprehensive
definitions of responsibility with each European institution
having a stake in security issues.
But these are not ideal times. Many NATO members have
differing views on these issues, as well as differing national
agendas and objectives for the various competing institutions
13
that will further complicate consensus-building efforts.
Furthermore, NATO will have to handle these prickly issues
concurrently--in terms of dealing with institutions, as well as
responding to crises. If NATO is to succeed in these efforts,
then the Alliance will have to take the lead. No other
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institution has the degree of necessary consensus or the apparent
willingness to confront these issues. Equally important, within
NATO, the United States must take a stronger role and resolve the
many differences among the major European powers, as well as
between the United States and its NATO allies. This will require
the United States to demonstrate forethought, patience, and
improved leadership qualities.
Guidelines for Defense.

Principles of Alliance Strategy. Despite an increased
reliance on political means, the Strategic Concept retains a
significant military component. The Alliance remains purely
defensive in purpose, and retains deterrence, and, if necessary
defense, as key military elements of NATO strategy. The enduring
role of Alliance military forces is to assure the territorial
integrity and political independence of NATO members. The
collective nature of NATO continues to apply to the equitable
sharing of roles, risks, and responsibilities. Lastly, collective
defense remains the best means to preclude the renationalization
14
of defense policies.
One strategic principle has drawn remarkably little comment,
especially given the usual sensitivity of nuclear issues in
Europe. The Strategic Concept retains the Alliance's reliance on
an appropriate mix of conventional and nuclear weapons, and
reaffirms the continued importance of nuclear weapons in
supporting the Alliance's policy of deterrence. Moreover, NATO
allies remain committed to continued modernization of its nuclear
systems, another issue that usually has generated considerable
15
controversy.
The Alliance's New Force Posture.

The Missions of Alliance Military Forces. While Alliance
military forces must remain capable of conducting large-scale
warfare that provides the final insurance against a general war,
NATO authorities consider such an outcome highly unlikely. As a
result, the Alliance posed additional missions for NATO military
forces. And, in keeping with the Alliance's increased
participation in crisis management and conflict prevention, as
well as defense of Alliance interests, NATO forces would no
longer have solely a wartime role. Forces would be required to
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perform different functions in peace, crisis, and war. In peace,
NATO forces would promote stability and provide strategic
balance, as well as contribute toward dialogue and cooperation.
In crises, Alliance forces ". . . can complement and reinforce
political actions within a broad approach to security, and
thereby contribute to the management of crises and their peaceful
17
resolution."
How NATO forces will accomplish this difficult task has not
yet been answered. To ensure that the use of military force
contributes to, rather than detracts from, crisis management and
resolution requires detailed military strategic guidance and
operational level planning. Before such comprehensive planning
can occur in NATO, members must reach a political consensus on
such key points as; NATO versus national interests involved, the
degree of military participation nations are willing to
underwrite, funding provisions, and command and control
arrangements, to name only a few.
NATO members, however, traditionally have been averse to
obligating themselves militarily in advance of a crisis. And, as
the NATO experience in the Balkans clearly indicates, nations may
be equally reluctant to commit when the fuller parameters of a
crisis are unknown. Until such time, therefore, that realistic
military planning and capabilities, and, more importantly, the
political will to employ those capabilities, provide credible
muscle to the lofty rhetoric of the Strategic Concept, the words
will remain little more than empty promises.
This conclusion does not imply that the Alliance should
simply shrug its collective shoulders and wait for the next
crisis to catch it unaware and unprepared. Alternative steps are
available for the Alliance to pursue. First, NATO nations must
face up to the fact that the Alliance is not likely to underwrite
substantial preplanning for military participation in crisis
management. Second, to compensate for the absence of preplanning,
the Alliance--individually and collectively--must provide
capabilities such as those suggested below that will ensure a
rapid response to an emerging crisis:
• Subordinate headquarters that will likely be charged with
carrying out such missions must receive detailed military
strategic and operational level guidance that is essential for
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effective planning.
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• Increased intelligence gathering capabilities and staffs
to monitor conditions, track emerging events, and provide rapid
assessments of an emerging crisis. Because of the importance of
political issues in crisis management, intelligence efforts must
go beyond strictly military intelligence functions and provide
for a thorough understanding of political-military issues.
• Sufficient communications capabilities (e.g., strategic
level communications, mobile ground stations, access to
satellites) to ensure adequate command and control of operations.
• Planning staffs in the various Major Subordinate Command
(MSC) and Principle Subordinate Command (PSC) headquarters need
to be augmented to provide the "surge" capability necessary to
respond to a quickly rising crisis, as well as to keep pace with
rapidly changing conditions and contingencies. This may
especially apply to logistics planning staffs, who habitually
have been under-represented in many NATO headquarters because
logistics has always been a national responsibility.
• Mobile, deployable staff cells need to be created within
the various headquarters. These cells must be physically and
intellectually capable of responding to rapidly changing
situations. Personnel readiness requirements may have to be
altered in some nations to comply with these requirements.
• Redundancies need to build into staffs to provide for
sufficient numbers and types of personnel in the event a nation
chooses not to participate in an operation.
• Redundancies also need to be integrated into each
headquarters to ensure that in the event of a deployment,
sufficient personnel are on hand within the primary headquarters
to perform daily requirements, as well as to ensure rotation of
deployed personnel.

Guidelines for the Alliance's Force Posture. To fulfill
their charge to support political efforts to manage or resolve
crises, NATO forces must ". . . have a capability for measured
and timely responses . . .; the capability to deter action
against an Ally and, in the event that aggression takes place, to
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respond to and repel it as well as establish the territorial
19
integrity of member states." Consequently, the Strategic Concept
stipulates that the size, readiness, and deployment of Alliance
forces would vary according to their geographic locality, their
mission, and their deployment requirements. The overall size of
NATO forces has been greatly decreased and, in many cases,
readiness has been significantly (perhaps imprudently) reduced.
The idea of "Forward Defense" along Alliance frontiers,
particularly the linear defense of the Central Region, has been
replaced with a reduced forward presence. That said, the
Strategic Concept acknowledges that the northern and southern
tiers of Allied Command Europe (ACE) face greater risks and
shorter warning times, and that national and NATO force postures
20
must reflect these differences.
To ensure that lower residual force levels would be capable
of participating effectively in crisis management and conflict
prevention, as well as fulfilling their traditional defense
missions, the Strategic Concept provides more detailed guidance.
Specifically, the Alliance would require ". . . limited, but
militarily significant . . . ground, air, and sea immediate and
rapid reaction elements able to respond to a wide range of
21
eventualities, many of which are unforeseeable." Importantly,
these forces also must be able to deter a limited attack, and, if
necessary, defend Alliance territory until additional forces
22
arrived.
To provide those additional forces, the Strategic Concept
establishes the requirement to build up forces through
mobilization, reinforcement, and reconstitution, and deploy them
quickly. Interestingly, the Strategic Concept notes that such
forces must also possess the ability to draw down ". . . quickly
and discriminately . . . [through] flexible and timely responses
23
in order to reduce and defuse tensions." Finally, while
acknowledging the long-held tradition of close political control
of crisis management actions, the strategy calls for a review of
crisis management procedures in light of the new security
24
environment.

Characteristics of Conventional Forces. In addition to
immediate and rapid reaction forces mentioned above, the
Strategic Concept calls for the Alliance's military structure to
include main defense and augmentation forces which are composed
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of active and mobilizable elements. It also describes the
requisite capabilities of ground, maritime, and air forces, which
largely reiterate traditional requirements. Of greater interest
is the recognition that significantly reduced force structures
would require increased reliance on integrated military
structures, as well as the establishment of multinational
25
formations--particularly among ground forces.
The Allies also articulated the capabilities--to be
maintained or created--necessary to underwrite crisis management
and rapid reaction capabilities: effective surveillance and
intelligence, adequate command and control organizations and
procedures, strategic mobility between regions--to include units
capable of rapid deployment, the air and sea assets to transport
them, and improved logistics capabilities. Further, NATO
authorities underscored the requirement that forces from all
three elements--reaction, main defense, and augmentation--must be
26
prepared for intra-European reinforcement roles.

Characteristics of Nuclear Forces. The Strategic Concept
also outlines the characteristics of NATO's future nuclear
forces. First, nuclear weapons would remain political instruments
". . . to preserve peace and prevent coercion and any kind of
27
war." Second, to demonstrate Alliance solidarity and strengthen
nuclear deterrence, nations would continue to share burdens,
roles, and responsibilities--to include collective defense
planning in nuclear roles, as well as peacetime basing of nuclear
28
forces on their territory. Third, NATO nuclear forces would ". .
. need to have the necessary characteristics and appropriate
flexibility and survivability, to be perceived as a credible and
29
effective element of the Allies strategy for preventing war." In
short, nuclear forces will remain the deterrent force of ultimate
resort.
At the same time, the Alliance recognized that the changed
security environment in Europe permitted radical changes in the
Alliance nuclear force posture. As a result, they agreed to
maintain nuclear forces at ". . . the minimum level sufficient to
preserve peace and stability," to reduce significantly the number
of sub-strategic nuclear systems, and to eliminate all nuclear
30
artillery and ground launched short-range nuclear missiles.
While these provisions seem a radical departure from past NATO
strategy, they nonetheless reflect continuity with more recent
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initiatives to reduce NATO's nuclear stockpiles.

31

IMPLEMENTATION AND FOLLOW-ON INITIATIVES
The Alliance's New Strategic Concept represents a beginning,
not an end. Thus, despite the charges of some critics, the
Alliance has not sat on its collective hands since November
32
1991. To the contrary, NATO not only has implemented its
Strategic Concept, it has undertaken a number of significant
political and military initiatives to effect the letter and
intent of its strategy. The report next turns to an examination
and assessment of these efforts.
Political Initiatives.
• Dialogue and Cooperation.

The North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC). On the
political side, NATO has widened significantly the scope of
cooperation and dialogue that has been long underway. In December
1991, for example, the NACC convened for the first time. Composed
of all NATO members, Central and Eastern European states that
formerly belonged to the former Warsaw Pact, and the successor
states to the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the NACC
is a forum for the Atlantic Alliance and its new partners.
Although criticized by some as a mere "talk shop," the NACC
provides an essential interface between NATO and its former
33
adversaries. Within the NACC, members can raise and explore
issues of mutual interest in a common forum that promotes
confidence building and trust. Additionally, the NACC has
undertaken a substantive yearly work program that has addressed
such issues as policy and security, defense planning, defense
34
conversion, economics, science, and air traffic management. Most
important, perhaps, the NACC Ad Hoc Group on Cooperation in
Peacekeeping has sought to harmonize peacekeeping doctrines,
35
practices, and procedures.
• Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
(OSCE). NATO allies have continued to be the driving force in the
OSCE (formerly CSCE) process begun in Helsinki in 1975. OSCE
signatories implemented the provisions of the Charter of Paris
(November 1990)--to include the new structures and institutions
of the OSCE process--and the Vienna Document 90 on Confidence and
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Security Building Measures (CSBMs)(November 1990). Implementing
the Vienna Document 92 on CSBMs signed in March 1992 has enhanced
36
these efforts. Follow-on OSCE conferences in Helsinki (1992) and
Budapest (1994) that set forth additional initiatives to improve
trust, confidence, and stability in Europe have reinforced
Alliance efforts at enhancing dialogue and cooperation within
37
Europe.
• Arms Control Initiatives. The Alliance also continues its
arms control efforts, and with considerable success. NATO allies
and their partners in Central and Eastern Europe are in the midst
of implementing the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE)
that is on track to eliminate nearly 70,000 items of treaty
38
limited equipment by the end of 1995. The Alliance and its
Central and East European interlocutors also concluded the CFE IA
agreement that set national limits on the personnel strength of
conventional armed forces in the Atlantic to the Urals (ATTU)
39
area (July 1992). NATO has also taken up the important cause of
40
nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Finally,
although they are bilateral U.S.-Russian initiatives, the
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties (START I and II) enjoy Alliance
support.
NATO's intense focus on arms control treaties and their
implementation had unexpected, but significant, consequences for
the Alliance's ability to respond to the post-Cold War security
environment. Because of the massive reductions in force
structures and the reorganizations which they generated, national
and NATO military planners were absorbed in revamping national
and NATO force structures and command and control arrangements.
Consequently, they were neither well-prepared for events in the
Balkans nor were they able to devote the attention necessary to
respond effectively to the demands of the accelerating crisis.
Had NATO military authorities been able to devote their full
attention to this issue, the Alliance probably would have
responded in a more effective manner.
• Partnership for Peace (PfP). NATO further reinforced its
commitment to cooperation and dialogue at the January 1994 Summit
in Brussels, when the Alliance established the PfP program. In
the words of the official invitation, PfP will ". . . expand and
intensify political and military cooperation within Europe,
increase stability, diminish threats to peace, and build
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strengthened relationships . . . ." Under the authority of the
North Atlantic Council (NAC) and within the framework of the
NACC, NATO invited new partners, on an individual basis and at
their own pace, to participate in key political and military
activities within NATO headquarters. Such activities include but
are not limited to peacekeeping exercises, increased transparency
of defense budgets, democratic control of armed forces,
cooperative military relations, ". . . and the development, over
the longer term, of forces that are better able to operate with
42
those of the members of the North Atlantic Alliance."
Significantly, the PfP invitation also stipulated that the
Alliance would ". . . consult with any active participant in the
Partnership if that Partner perceives a direct threat to its
43
territorial integrity, political independence, or security;"
effectively extending, de facto, provisions of Article IV of the
44
Washington Treaty to those states that join PfP. Importantly,
this consultation would take place at "16 +1" (i.e., with NATO
and the affected state), rather than at 36 (NACC) or 53 (OSCE)
where efforts to arrive at a rapid solution obviously would be
more complicated.
45

Despite the charges that PfP does not go far enough, PfP
must be recognized for what it is: the best means, to date, to
prepare states for potential NATO membership. By offering,
implicitly at least, a potential pathway to NATO membership to
those nations committed to joining the Alliance, PfP represents a
significant step beyond simple cooperation and dialogue. And,
when PfP is viewed together with other Alliance initiatives,
there can be little doubt that the Alliance has more than
fulfilled its commitment to increased dialogue and cooperation.
• Crisis Management and Conflict Prevention.
The Alliance took another significant step in implementing
the Strategic Concept when NATO foreign ministers agreed at Oslo
in June 1992 ". . . to support, on a case-by-case basis in
accordance with our own procedures, peacekeeping activities under
the responsibility of the CSCE, including by making available
46
Alliance resources and expertise." More importantly, the
Alliance quickly turned theory into action, as NATO undertook
support of U.N. efforts to resolve the ongoing crisis in the
former Yugoslavia.
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NATO participation in efforts to mitigate the war in BosniaHercegovina and to assist in crisis management has been
extensive, if not entirely successful. In conjunction with the
WEU, NATO began conducting maritime operations in support of U.N.
mandates in July 1992 (currently named Operation SHARP GUARD). In
October 1992, the Alliance began monitoring the air space over
the former Yugoslavia. Moreover, in November 1992, NATO had
dispatched a substantial portion of Headquarters, Northern Army
Group to serve as the core of the U.N. Protection Force
(UNPROFOR) command and control structure in the former
Yugoslavia. In April 1993, air monitoring operations turned to
enforcing the U.N. "no-fly" zone over the former Yugoslavia
47
(Operation DENY FLIGHT). Shortly thereafter NATO's role expanded
to include providing close air support to defend UNPROFOR, as
well as U.N. "safe areas" in Bosnia-Hercegovina. The Alliance
later expanded its efforts to include close air support of
49
humanitarian assistance operations.
On February 28, 1994, NATO involvement deepened
significantly when Alliance aircraft shot down four fixed-wing
aircraft violating the "no-fly" zone. Close on the heels of this
event, NATO aircraft responded to the first UNPROFOR request for
close air support on March 12, 1994 (although the aircraft
attacked no ground targets). NATO participation continued to
escalate as the threat of NATO air strikes was used to halt
ethnic Serbian attacks on U.N.-declared "safe areas" in eastern
49
Bosnia. In August and September 1994, NATO aircraft attacked
ground targets, as Bosnian Serbs refused to abide by U.N.
resolutions regarding the "heavy weapons exclusion" zone around
Sarajevo. Continuing Serbian violations of U.N. resolutions
resulted in NATO aircraft, at the request of UNPROFOR, attacking
the Bosnian Serb air base at Ubdina, Croatia, on November 21,
1994. Finally, on November 23, 1994, NATO aircraft struck
surface-to-air missile sites that had illuminated NATO
50
reconnaissance aircraft with their target acquisition radars.
By this point, however, serious strains had been growing
within the Alliance for some time, and internal consensus over
the Alliance's further role in conflict management in BosniaHercegovina broke down. On the one hand, the United States
advocated tougher military action, especially air strikes (but
without offering to provide U.S. ground troops), to retaliate
against ethnic Serbian acts, and to force the pace of

14

negotiations to end the conflict. On the other hand, the
principal providers of UNPROFOR forces (especially key NATO
members France and Britain) supported a more restrained approach.
Tensions built for several months until the unilateral U.S.
withdrawal from enforcing U.N. maritime sanctions openly split
the Alliance, perhaps most seriously since the Suez Crisis
(1956), and shattered the fragile consensus for muscular NATO
51
support of U.N. operations within Bosnia-Hercegovina. Moreover,
it called into question NATO's support of peace operations in
general.
This result should come as no surprise. NATO may have rushed
to judgement on the issue of participation in peace operations,
pushed too early into a decision by the advocates of "out of area
52
or out of business." As a result, NATO engaged in peace
operations before its members had fully debated and agreed on its
future role, much less on its function in peace operations.
Indeed, little consensus exists within key Alliance countries
about their participation in such efforts. For example, within
the United States (despite Presidential Decision Directive [PDD]
25, "The Clinton Administration's Policy on Reforming
Multilateral Peace Operations"), the Executive Branch and
Congress continue to debate the extent of future U.S. engagement
53
in peace operations. Similarly, within Germany the
constitutional issue of German forces conducting operations
outside of national territory has been legally resolved, but the
extent of future German participation in peace operations is a
54
political question that remains unanswered. Moreover, France and
Britain, two critical actors in Bosnian peacekeeping efforts are
reviewing their potential future roles in peacekeeping
55
operations. Finally, for many of the smaller members of the
Alliance, force structure cuts and reduced readiness may render
moot the question of participating in peace operations.
Thus, while the situation in Bosnia may be unique, the
strains resulting from NATO participation in the crisis go beyond
the bounds of this one issue, and strike at the core of whether
NATO members, individually or collectively, possess the political
will to participate in peace operations. Moreover, the Alliance
is spending too much time and effort on this issue that should be
spent on more compelling concerns facing the Alliance. The
Alliance should, therefore, defer further participation in OSCE
or U.N. peace operations until such time that it can reach
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internal consensus on the extent of NATO support for peace
operations, as well as a more precise division of labor between
the various interlocking European security organizations.
Military Initiatives.
• Defense Policy Guidance.
NATO military authorities also have been actively engaged in
implementing the Alliance's strategic vision. In conjunction with
the publication of the Strategic Concept, the NATO Military
Committee (MC) announced the December 1991 promulgation of MC
400, Military Guidance for the Implementation of the Alliance's
56
Strategic Concept. The guidance stipulated the requirement for
highly mobile forces that had access to timely and accurate
intelligence, and were supported by adequate transport,
logistics, and infrastructure. Without going into specifics, the
document outlined reinforcement, mobilization, and reconstitution
requirements, addressed peacetime positioning of forces, and
57
framed readiness and training requirements and responsibilities.
• Restructuring Alliance Forces.

New Force Structures. In accordance with the Strategic
Concept, Alliance forces have been divided into reaction forces,
main defense forces, and augmentation forces. Reaction forces are
composed of active duty formations maintained at high levels of
readiness that give NATO military authorities the capability to
respond quickly and flexibly to crisis developments on land, in
58
the air, and on the sea. Reaction forces consist of immediate
reaction forces (IRF) and rapid reaction forces (RRF). Immediate
reaction forces include the ACE Mobile Force (AMF)--Land and Air
(long-standing NATO forces, but augmented from their past
structures), and, for the first time, Standing Allied Naval
Forces: Atlantic (STANAVFORLANT), Minesweepers (STANAVFORMIN),
59
and Mediterranean (STANAVFORMED), a new organization. (See
Figure 1.)
Rapid reaction forces also contain air, sea, and land
elements. Air and maritime components needed beyond those
available in the IRF will be provided by nations on an asrequired basis. Land rapid reaction forces will come from the ACE
Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) (See Figure 2). Commander, ARRC can
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draw from a pool of national units, but current plans anticipate
that no more than four divisions plus corps troops would be
deployed at any one time. The composition of the deployed force
would depend upon the mission, the geographic area for
60
deployment, and the forces that nations make available.
Main defense forces provide the bulk of NATO's force
structure. These forces are charged, in conjunction with he
Reaction Forces, with the immediate defense of Alliance
61
territory. Built around a combination of national and
multinational units, main defense forces would consist of a
62
mixture of active and mobilizable formations. On NATO's northern
and southern borders, the size and readiness of main defense
forces could vary considerably--smaller forces in the north and
increasing numbers as one progresses from west to east along
63
NATO's southern tier. Within the Central Region, main defense
forces--reduced significantly from Cold War levels--will rely
more heavily on mobilizable units with longer readiness times,
and are organized into five multinational corps and one German
national corps in eastern Germany that falls under NATO command
and control (Figure 3).
Augmentation forces provide operational and strategic
reserves for the Alliance, and, therefore, are not dedicated to a
particular region. These forces consist largely of national
forces not charged with rapid reaction or main defense missions,
and will be capable of reinforcing rapidly from less threatened
areas of the Alliance. Formations are held in varying states of
readiness, but NATO will depend heavily on mobilizable forces.
And, while augmentation forces could come from anywhere within
the Alliance, NATO will continue to rely heavily on the United
64
States.
As indicated earlier, multinational formations will play an
important role in Alliance force structures. In the case of
reaction forces, multinational formations promote cohesion,
reinforce transatlantic links, and demonstrate Alliance
65
solidarity and commitment to collective defense. For main
defense forces, NATO leaders envisaged that the establishment of
standing multinational formations would manifest continued
66
Alliance solidarity. Moreover, they hoped to demonstrate that
the Alliance had moved away from the Cold War alignment of
67
national corps along the now defunct Inter-German Border.
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Finally, an unstated but fervent hope of many NATO planners was
that reliance on multinational forces might impede the "force
structure free fall" already underway, particularly in the
Central Region, as nations sought to maximize the peace dividend.
While the merits of multinationality are appealing, one
should not forget the difficulties inherent in transforming
political initiatives into military reality. Differing languages,
force structures, doctrines, readiness requirements, training
standards, and organizational cultures can severely complicate
the role of the multinational commander and his subordinates.
Moreover, reliance on multinational formations will only
exacerbate the nettlesome problem of interoperability of
procedures, equipment, communications, repair parts, and
ammunition that has long plagued NATO. Finally, the always
sensitive issue of command and control arrangements--particularly
the differences between Article V and non-Article V operations-68
will require resolution. This is not to argue against the use of
multinational formations. The intent is simply to ensure that
NATO authorities understand the time, energy, and resources that
will be required to ensure such units are capable of implementing
the Alliance's Strategic Concept.

Force Reductions and Their Implications. Concomitant with
establishing new structures, military authorities have overseen
significant reductions in Alliance forces (at aggregate, as well
69
as national levels). To a large extent, these reductions turned
necessity into virtue as the Strategic Concept simply ratified
arms control agreements and the changed security environment.
Under the terms of the CFE Treaty, Alliance reductions amount to:
tanks (18 percent); artillery (7 percent), and armored combat
70
vehicles (7.7 percent). Furthermore, provisions of the CFE IA
Treaty (in which nations declared ceilings on the number of
personnel in their respective armed forces) reinforced equipment
reductions.
Many nations, however, have taken cuts much deeper than
required under the CFE Treaties in an effort to reap the maximum
possible peace dividend. By 1997, according to NATO sources, the
overall military strength of the Alliance will have fallen 25
percent from 1990 levels. But this figure conceals significant
disparities. Norway, for example, will cut its total mobilizable
ground strength from 160,000 to 100,000 personnel, and reduce its
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ground force structure from 13 to 6 brigades. In the Central
Region, air and ground forces will realize reductions of about 45
72
percent. Across NATO's southern tier, Spain will cut its armed
forces by approximately 44 percent and Italy plans a reduction of
roughly 25 percent. Portugal plans moderate reductions, while
Greece will make little or none, and Turkey will reduce
significantly personnel strengths (620,000 to 350,000 personnel)
73
while increasing items of modern equipment.
While these reductions may make sense from a national
perspective (i.e., the reduced threat in Europe and, in some
cases, the perceived diminished need to employ forces outside
Europe), the magnitude of the cutbacks may not make sense given
the requirements outlined in the Strategic Concept. In short,
because military forces ultimately guarantee key provisions of
the political element of the strategy (e.g., deterrence, crisis
management and resolution), insufficient forces call into
question the viability of the Alliance's Strategic Concept.
Indeed, as early as December 1992, the severity of planned
reductions in main defense forces, particularly in the Central
Region, precipitated the Defense Planning Committee (DPC) to
order ". . . a review of the implications of changing force
74
levels for the new force structure." A year later, Defense
Ministers noted the defense savings achieved, but emphasized that
NATO members must provide the financial means necessary to
75
underwrite defense plans. Specifically, the DPC highlighted the
importance of ". . . modernization and improvements in strategic
mobility, command and control, and sustainability . . . [as well
as forces] properly trained and equipped for the full range of
76
missions and tasks they may be called upon to fulfill."
The DPC has been concerned because, in designing their postCold War force structures, nations have failed to take into
account other demands that could require larger national
77
contributions than apparently envisaged. For example, Central
Region countries must retain sufficient forces to meet their NATO
requirements for main defense units in Central Europe. At the
same time, they must maintain forces to meet national objectives
inside (e.g., the UK in Northern Ireland; or the UK, France,
Netherlands, and Spain in Bosnia), as well as outside Europe
(e.g., Belgium and France in Africa; or any number of European
states in the Middle East). Finally, NATO members, for the first
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time, must be prepared to dispatch reinforcements from their
normal peacetime deployment locations to areas where risks exceed
78
the capabilities of national and ACE Rapid Reaction Forces.
Failure to provide forces sufficient to achieve these goals not
only calls into question the ability of NATO to execute its
Strategic Concept, but also the fundamental purpose of collective
defense.
The size of residual forces is not the only concern. In
December 1994, the DPC ". . . noted shortfalls in certain
capabilities, especially related to support for reaction forces,
ground based air defense, and strategic mobility, which could
have important implications for the implementation of all aspects
79
of Alliance strategy." To ensure these capabilities, units from
many nations will have to be structured differently than in the
past to meet new and challenging deployment and sustainment
requirements. This may be especially true of Central Region
formations that habitually have lacked adequate combat support
elements (e.g., artillery, air defense, intelligence). Moreover,
many of these countries relied on area support commands and civil
resources that have resulted in units with inadequate internal
logistics capability to support a prolonged deployment away from
home territory.
Finally, these numerous changes must be accomplished in a
time of increasing fiscal austerity. But restructuring,
especially if it entails substantial reorganization, acquisition
of new equipment or capabilities, or repositioning of peacetime
stationing, can be very expensive. At the same time, day-to-day
operational costs are rising, as the employment of national and
80
NATO forces has increased significantly over Cold War levels.
Moreover, many nations failed to comprehend the considerable
hidden costs in force reductions (e.g., severance or early
retirement payments, destruction of equipment, increased unit
costs of equipment, and environmental clean up) that must be
81
added to normal operating costs. Thus, caught in the squeeze
between force restructuring costs, daily operational
expenditures, and shrinking defense budgets, many NATO nations
82
may be mortgaging the future in order to pay current bills. This
holds the significant potential, over the short- and long-term,
to frustrate implementation of the Strategic Concept. More
importantly, it holds the potential to undermine the long-term
viability of the Alliance.
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INSIGHTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
In a simple, but not simplistic, sense, the art of strategy
constitutes the continuous balancing of objectives, implementing
concepts, and resources (also known as ends, ways, and means).
Thus, while significant, NATO's promulgation of its Strategic
Concept represents only a first step. Equally important are the
implementing concepts that provide concrete ways to achieve
strategic ends, and, especially, the human and fiscal means--and
as importantly, the political will to expend those means--that
breathe life into those options. An assessment of these points,
and their critical interrelationships may provide, therefore, a
helpful construct for assessing whether NATO's Strategic Concept
can meet the demands of the 21st century.
Ends.
Numerous critics complain that with the demise of the Soviet
83
Union, the rationale for NATO has disappeared. Granted, members
founded the Alliance in response to the threat posed by
communism, but the principles of the Washington Treaty are more
enduring than many critics admit. NATO, undoubtedly, will have to
respond to changed strategic circumstances; but the requirement
is to adapt, not to dissolve a vital element of European
security. The question that should be the focus of attention,
then, should not be whether NATO should survive, but how shall
the Alliance adapt? This, in turn, leads to the issue of what, in
the absence of the Communist threat, should be NATO's primary
purpose?
The Strategic Concept began the process of answering that
question by reaffirming the principles of the Washington Treaty,
and stipulating that NATO shall remain a collective defense
organization. But the Alliance's New Strategic Concept also
indicates that NATO increasingly will be involved in collective
security type tasks which can undermine the ability to perform
collective defense functions. To complicate matters further,
numerous influential commentators have posed additional roles for
the Alliance to consider that, together, offer a broad and
frequently contradictory menu of choices for the Alliance to
pursue:
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• A collective defense organization;
• A collective security organization for Europe: e.g., the
military arm of the OSCE (loosely, the "out of area or out of
business" option);
• A regional collective security organization for the United
Nations;
• A means to unite the two former adversarial blocs.
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Recent events, predominantly the imbroglio over NATO's role
in the ongoing war in the former Yugoslavia, indicate that a NATO
role as a collective security organization or the military arm of
the OSCE or the U.N. is becoming less likely. Nor do shrinking
budgets, and increasing distractions from other demanding issues
(e.g., national preoccupation with economics and demographics, EU
expansion, war in the Balkans, perceived risks from the
Mediterranean, or the rising crises in the former Soviet Union)
auger the rapid development of a consensus for the Alliance
becoming a purely collective security organ. That said, pressures
for NATO to assume a collective security role are not
insignificant and could continue to vex NATO for some time.
Using NATO as a means to unite the former adversarial blocs
is equally problematic. For example, does NATO want to expand
significantly its membership? How does the Alliance ensure
adherence to the membership criteria specified in Article II of
the Washington Treaty? At what point would the Alliance cease to
be a collective defense organization and become a collective
security organization? How does the Alliance ensure that each
former adversary is fully prepared for NATO membership? How does
the Alliance incorporate former constituent parts of the Soviet
Union without offending Russia? Finally, uniting former
adversaries implies addressing possible Russian membership in
NATO. How the Alliance could absorb a state the size of Russia,
with its security concerns far beyond the bounds of Europe (i.e.,
the Middle East, Central Asia, and Asia) is a very difficult
question.
Almost by default, logic leads one to conclude that NATO
should remain focused solely on its collective defense dimension.
But such a conclusion does the Alliance an injustice, for even in
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the absence of the massive threat that spawned it, NATO can play
a number of vital continuing roles. First, the Alliance can
sustain stability in Western and Southern Europe that will
promote continued economic well-being--no small contribution.
Second, it can extend the stability and improved prosperity that
usually flows from a sturdy security environment into the
emerging democracies of Central and Eastern Europe. Third, the
Alliance can continue to perform its long-standing internal
collective security function at the political level: e.g.,
integration first of West Germany into Cold War Europe, and then
a united Germany into the new Europe; denationalization of
defense and security policies; and dampening of tensions and
conflicts between member states (the most notable example being
Greece and Turkey).
The Alliance must decide quickly the fundamental nature of
its future role. Current debates over NATO's role in BosniaHercegovina, future participation in peace operations, and the
precise boundaries between NATO and the other security
institutions in Europe sap considerable NATO energy and divert
the Alliance from other critical issues. NATO, therefore, must
squarely confront the issue of whether it will remain a
collective defense organization, and devote the time and effort
necessary to achieve consensus. This may require the Alliance to
defer, for the foreseeable future, participation in peace
operations or other missions that fall outside the parameters of
collective defense. Nor does this argue for strict limits of
territorial defense. In keeping with the precepts of the
Strategic Concept, the defense of NATO interests should guide
discussions, not simply the traditional mission of guaranteeing
the territorial integrity of Alliance members.
Ways.
In an ideal sense, the various concepts proposed to
implement the Strategic Concept appear highly suitable. For
example, dialogue and cooperation continue apace. The Alliance
continues to implement arms control and disarmament treaties or
agreements, most notably the CFE Treaty and the various Vienna
CSBM documents. The NACC has expanded its responsibilities and,
more importantly, increased the results of its labors. The PfP
Program now includes 25 members. Finally, the Alliance is
examining potential pathways and timings for expanded NATO
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membership for those partners that meet NATO's as yet unforeseen
criteria.
But reality intrudes. PfP participation and expanded
membership have run into obstacles that may delay expansion of
the Alliance. Importantly, these hurdles result not from the lack
of commitment of potential members to adapt to NATO requirements,
but from the Alliance's inability to forge a short-term consensus
over the parameters for, or even the desirability of, adding new
members. Indeed, efforts to date have been more effective at
undermining NATO than in buttressing the security of the
85
Alliance.
How enlargement proceeds also hinges significantly on the
type of organization the Alliance will remain or become. If the
Alliance continues to add new members, it will at some point
cease to be a collective defense organization. Where or when that
point might be reached cannot be forecast with any accuracy, but
some indicators include:
• Expanded membership that retards or precludes rapid
consensus-building and decisionmaking;
• Addition of Central and East European states that have
intramural conflicts (similar to Greece and Turkey) which
constrain or paralyze Alliance decisionmaking; and,
• Russian membership which, given the size of Russia, would
dwarf the remaining European members, as well as add massive
additional NATO defense commitments along Russia's turbulent
frontiers.
Thus, key questions about who is offered membership, under
what conditions, when, and with what timetable will have to be
answered after NATO has decided the strategic objectives and
purpose of the Alliance. These conditions, therefore, argue for a
slower NATO expansion that contributes to the continued stability
of the Alliance and Europe rather than rapid incorporation of new
states that may add little beyond burdensome security
requirements. Moreover, this implies that NATO membership should
be kept small for the foreseeable future.
As part of this procedure, the Alliance must assess how new
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members might affect the equilibrium within NATO, upon which
hinges the stability of the remainder of Europe. This process may
require more time than many currently anticipate or desire. Until
NATO sorts out these issues, however, progress will necessarily
be slow, and PfP will likely remain a holding pen for aspirants.
This result is not entirely negative. While delays will not
assuage the security concerns of potential members, they will
permit them time to prepare for the rigors and responsibilities
of membership, while granting NATO a needed respite to forge the
consensus required for 16 separate and sovereign nations to be
able to ratify--individually or collectively--any accessions.
One final point on expanded NATO membership. Russia's
leaders have become vocal in their opposition to NATO adding new
86
members, particularly former Warsaw Pact countries. In
responding to these concerns, the Alliance must first take note
of and assuage Russian fears, but without giving Moscow a droit
de regard over NATO membership or policies. Second, regardless of
how membership increases, new lines will be drawn in European
security. The question should be not whether there will be new
lines, but how to prevent those lines from becoming impermeable.
And, even if these lines harden, that result may be preferable to
a security vacuum that leaves Central and Eastern European states
twisting in the wind. Finally, notwithstanding NATO actions,
Russian leaders will make the final decision on how to respond.
87
Given this fact and the historical failure of appeasement, NATO
should carefully consider the cost-benefit calculus of placating
Russia on this issue.
Efforts to engage the Alliance in crisis management and
conflict prevention also have been problematical. Indeed, ongoing
NATO efforts in the Balkans have caused the greatest crisis in
the Alliance since NATO's "dual track" nuclear decision in the
88
early-1980s or, perhaps, since the Suez Crisis (1956). If press
reports are to be believed, fissure lines between major allies
89
run long and deep. And, there are no signs that these issues
will abate anytime soon. Thus, despite the rhetoric of involving
NATO in such operations as a means to promote European stability,
recent events have not borne out that assumption. Moreover, the
animus created by these efforts indicates that such operations
will not be easily undertaken in the future. As a result, the
concept of crisis management and conflict prevention will likely
remain unfulfilled for the foreseeable future.
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In summary, although adequate in an ideal sense, NATO
implementing concepts need to be tempered with reality. Most
importantly, NATO, whether at the national or Alliance level,
must create the internal consensus necessary to provide the
requisite political will to proceed with the new tasks contained
in the Strategic Concept. Until such time that such consensus
becomes more manifest, the Alliance should heed the following
admonitions:
• Proceed with enlargement, but at a measured pace. While
recognizing that there may be some urgency in adding new members,
NATO should not move precipitously. Those who advocate "enlarge
or become irrelevant" may kill the Alliance if membership is
expanded so rapidly that the ability to achieve consensus on
critical issues is destroyed, and with it the Alliance's
effectiveness.
• Continue the PfP process, which represents the best
methodology, in terms of preparing potential candidates, as well
as the Alliance, to accept additional members.
• Defer collective security missions for OSCE and the U.N.
until such time as the Alliance has achieved consensus on the
parameters for these difficult missions. After having been pushed
into the decision by the "out of area or out of business" crowd,
it is time to reconsider that choice in light of the evolving
European security environment, and the apparent unwillingness of
some members of the Alliance to underwrite such operations. This
does not argue that the Alliance should forego peace operations,
only that it must take the time necessary to debate the issues
more fully, and establish a firmer Alliance consensus on what
NATO is or is not willing to do.
• Postpone non-Article V missions until a greater consensus
can be achieved within the Alliance on how to proceed with such
operations. This is not to say that non-Article V missions should
be shelved or that the Alliance should ignore the issue. But,
before NATO undertakes such operations, increased consultation is
necessary to work out the basic issues of Alliance participation
and to establish procedures for the conduct of operations.
• If NATO decides to engage in crisis management and
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conflict prevention operations, the Alliance should clearly
delimit how far it is willing to go--before it engages in such a
mission. For instance, should NATO only engage in peacekeeping
operations to enforce a settlement, or should it undertake all
forms of peace operations, to include peace enforcement?
Conversely, should the Alliance only undertake humanitarian
support operations? If the Alliance fails to consider this
calculus before intervention, it runs the risk of mission
failure, if not the collapse of Alliance consensus.
Means.
Whether sufficient resources are available to turn concepts
into reality is also an open-ended question. Despite the end of
the Cold War, cuts in NATO force structure may have gone too
deep. Moreover, force reductions have not been spread evenly, and
nations in the Central Region may have taken a disproportionate
share. At the same time, the Alliance has taken on new missions:
peace operations in support of OSCE or the U.N., non-Article V
missions, defense of NATO interests vice strictly NATO territory.
Such operations tend to be ground force and personnel intensive.
Further, several nations maintain national commitments that are
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stretching their militaries. Thus, while individually "minor"
(relative to the Cold War threat), the cumulative demands of
these operations may stress residual force structures beyond
their ability to fulfill their numerous and diverse missions,
thereby undercutting the credibility of the Alliance.
To prevent such a result, the Alliance must fix the mismatch
between its stated objectives and concepts and its force
structures. This admonition does not advocate stopping payment on
the "peace dividend" by halting force reductions. It may require
revising or restraining implementation of certain elements of the
Strategic Concept. And, it calls for a more rational expenditure
of national and Alliance funds for force structure. Individual
nations and the Alliance will be better served if they fund
adequately a smaller amount of remaining forces tailored to more
limited objectives, rather than maintaining larger force
structures that cannot be adequately supported and, therefore,
are incapable of fulfilling the Strategic Concept.
While nations may reduce their forces overall, some states
will have to restructure their armed forces to be more deployable
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and sustainable. Others will also require greater capabilities in
their combat support and combat service support units. In these
reorganizations, priority should go to rapid reaction forces,
even if this means reductions in the size and readiness of main
defense forces in the Central Region, many of which have been
stripped nearly bare.
To compensate for overall reductions in forces and readiness
of main defense and augmentation forces, the Strategic Concept
stipulated the requirement for interregional reinforcement. To
fulfill this condition will require more mobile forces, capable
of rapid strategic transport to the point of crisis. This may
require the purchase of, or the ability to "rent," strategic lift
assets, particularly aircraft. Furthermore, interregional
reinforcements must be highly interoperable and possess logistics
capabilities sufficient to sustain prolonged operations. They
also will require a greater capacity for combat support and
combat service support units. To achieve the capability of rapid
interregional reinforcement will also require a combination of
prepositioning of equipment and supplies, and improved
infrastructure--particularly in the Southern Region--to support
the receipt, storage and forward movement of forces and supplies.
In short, to effect the interregional reinforcement missions
laid out in the Strategic Concept will require the Alliance,
individually and collectively, to undertake a number of painful
initiatives:
• Ensuring strategic mobility, including aircraft and
shipping, sufficient to transport reinforcements to the point of
crisis in a timely fashion.
• Adequate infrastructure within the Central Region to
facilitate the rapid dispatch of forces, and on the flanks,
particularly NATO's southern tier, to permit the rapid receipt,
forward movement and sustainment of reinforcing formations.
• Strategic level command and control structures--at the
theater of war and theater of operations level, as well as
operational command and control headquarters (e.g., CJTF, ARRC)
that can be deployed to supervise operations anywhere in or out
of the NATO area.
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• Improved intelligence gathering and dissemination
capabilities at the strategic and operational levels of war.
• Improved Host Nation Support capabilities, particularly to
support operations along NATO's southern tier, whether in or out
of NATO area.
• At the operational level of war, NATO military authorities
need to ensure common, or at least compatible doctrines;
standardization and rationalization, interoperability and
interchange-ability of equipment and spare parts. The formation
of a new NATO Standardization Organization is a good start, but
nations must demonstrate the political will that permits these
91
efforts must bear fruit quickly.
• Reorganization of residual formations to provide adequate
combat support and combat service support units and capabilities.
This is especially true for many nations in the Central Region,
which heretofore relied upon area support commands that were once
suitable for operations in the Central Region, but which are tied
to a geographic area and are not capable of being deployed
outside Central Europe.
• Nations must not only provide their combat formations with
suitable levels of combat support and combat service support,
they must also construct logistics systems capable of sustaining
those forces after they have been deployed beyond national
boundaries. The high expenses entailed in creating such systems
and the constrained defense budgets of most NATO nations argue
for the creation of a NATO logistics command and support
structure. This would overturn the longstanding--and ineffective-dictum that logistics are a national responsibility. It would
also require increased standardization and interoperability of
equipment and resources. Undoubtedly, such a suggestion will
generate considerable controversy, but if the Alliance is serious
about the capability to execute inter-regional reinforcement,
such steps must be taken.
CONCLUSIONS
The Alliance's New Strategic Concept represents a dramatic
departure from past strategies, and, in an ideal sense, offers an
excellent starting point for preparing NATO for the considerable
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demands of the 21st century. But lofty goals and idealistic
implementing concepts ring hollow without the military means to
bring the Strategic Concept to fruition. This conclusion does not
imply that a focus on military forces will rectify NATO's
strategic dilemma. Inadequate force levels and capabilities and
an absence of detailed military planning are not the core
problem; these are merely manifestations of the lack of political
will--individual and collective--necessary within the Alliance to
undertake the painful steps needed to turn rhetoric into reality.
Creating the requisite political will is a progressive
process. First, the Alliance must firmly decide on its
fundamental purpose. While the Strategic Concept and subsequent
pronouncements have reaffirmed that collective defense remains
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the core function of the Alliance, core does not mean sole, and
the Alliance has increasingly looked to assume a collective
93
security function in Europe. But simply put, NATO can no longer
straddle the fence between collective defense and collective
security. Collective security missions run the risk of fatally
undermining NATO's ability to carry out its collective defense
function:
• Limited residual force structure may well be consumed with
peace support operations, and may not be available to respond to
collective defense requirements (e.g., an Article IV mission that
suddenly spills over into an Article V mission).
• Limited funds being spent on collective security
operations could result in long-term modernization being
postponed in order to pay for short-term collective security
operations.
• Most importantly, internal political conflicts over NATO's
role in peace support operations (e.g., the current row over
Bosnia-Hercegovina) could destroy consensus within the Alliance.
The Alliance, therefore, must focus on and protect its
stated core function of collective defense. But this is not the
collective defense of the Cold War. As the Strategic Concept
indicates, NATO must now protect not only its territorial
integrity, but also its interests. This will require NATO to
retain adequate forces that possess the capabilities to execute
key provisions of the Strategic Concept, specifically: adequate
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numbers and types of forces able to conduct modern operations,
the ability to transport those forces to the point of crisis and
to sustain them, and a command and control organization that
ensures effective and efficient application of Alliance military
power to achieve desired strategic aims. Most importantly, it
will require the political will to provide, employ, and sustain
these forces. Without these requisite means and the political
will to employ them, the lofty rhetoric of the Strategic Concept
will remain exactly that and NATO will slip into irrelevancy.
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